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Attorney's Liability in Non-Client and
Foreign Law Situations
John E. Martindale*
T HIS ARTICLE WILL EXAMINE the liability of an attorney for an
incorrect opinion where the complainant is not the attor-
ney's client. It will also give special consideration to the problem
of giving advice on the law of a jurisdiction other than the attor-
ney's own state.
An attorney is liable for all damage resulting to his client by
reason of improper or erroneous advice where an attorney of rea-
sonable knowledge and professional capacity exercising ordinary
care under the circumstances would have avoided the error.1
The measure of an attorney's performance is thus one of whether
or not he observed a reasonable standard of care in giving the
advice in question.
Whether this liability proceeds ex-contractu or ex-delicti is
a matter rarely considered by the courts in their opinions. In-
deed, many cases merely use language which assumes that the
liability exists without analysing its basis.2 There is, however,
ample authority for the proposition that the attorney's liability
may be predicated upon contract.3
The following quotation from Currey v. Butcher4 is accurate
in that it indicates that the action is not so much one for the
breach of the contract as for the breach of the duty the contract
creates.
Where one adopts the legal profession, and assumes to exer-
cise its duties in behalf of another for hire, the law imposes
a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, and if an injury
results to his client from want thereof he is liable to respond
in damages to the extent of the injury sustained. This duty
*Of the law firm of Arter, Hadden, Wykoff & Van Duzer of Cleveland,
Ohio; A.B., Harvard Univ.; LL.B., Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Bald-
win-Wallace College.
1 7 C. J. S. Attorney and Client, § 143, p. 980. See also 45 A. L. R. 2d 5.
2 E.g., Citizens Loan v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N. E. 1075 (1890).
8 Weekley v. Knight, 116 Fla. 721, 156 S. 625 (1934); Solomon v. Meyer, ---
Fla. , 116 S. 2d 37 (1959); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P. 2d 685
(1961); Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621 (1879).
4 37 Ore. 380, 61 P. 631 (1900).
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and liability arises from the relation of the parties under the
contract, rather than from the contract itself, and at common
law the injured party could sue, either in assumpsit, for a
breach of the implied promise, or in case, for the neglect of
duty; 3 Enc. P1 & Pr. 107.
The foregoing indicates that the action is either ex-contractu
or ex-delicti for the breach of a duty which exists because of a
contractual relationship. Much less consideration has been de-
voted, however, to the question of whether or not the attorney's
liability will sound in tort alone, where no contract is present.
This is obviously because most attorney malpractice cases arise
between attorney and client in a situation in which a contract of
employment is easily available upon which to place liability. The
case of Savings Bank v. Ward, which will be discussed at length
later in this article, is often cited for the proposition that the
attorney's liability sounds only in contract. Careful examination
of this case, however, does not indicate that it is so limited. The
court refers to the early case of Fish v. Kelley,5 wherein an
attorney was sued in negligence by one to whom he had given,
in answer to a casual inquiry, erroneous information as to the
contents of a deed. Erle, C.J., held that there was no relation
between the parties from which any contract could be implied
nor any relation between the parties from which any duty could
arise. It is obvious that the relationship of attorney-client, like
the relation between physician and patient, principal and agent,
and bailor and bailee, can arise quite without contract. It is
equally well established that the creation of these relationships
gives rise to certain duties for the breach of which an action for
damages will lie. It is therefore generally conceded that an ac-
tion by a client against his attorney will sound in tort for the
breach of the attorney's duty to exercise due care even where
there is no contract upon which to base liability.6 And it cannot
be doubted that the attorney may be liable to a third person
where there is in fact a contractual third party beneficiary situ-
ation or a tri-partite contract.
The more difficult question is that of the attorney's tort
liability when not even the relationship of attorney-client exists.
This, in fact, is the central problem in determining an attorney's
5 17 C.B.N.S. 193, as cited in Savings Bank v. Ward, n. 3 supra.
6 Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897); 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at
Law, § 47, p. 287; Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1917 B, p. 6; 45 A. L. R. 2d 14.
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liability to third persons who are not parties to the attorney's
employment contract with his client.
II
In considering the attorney's liability to third persons for
misrepresentations or inaccuracies as to the law in his opinion,
it must be stated at the outset that if the attorney's conduct
meets the requirements for an action of fraud, the existence or
non-existence of an attorney-client relation between the parties
will be immaterial, and the fact that representations or misrepre-
sentations as to matters of law are not normally actionable on the
basis of fraud will be no defense. 7 The attorney will be liable for
the results of his fraudulent conduct. Referring again to the
case of Fish v. Kelley,8 which involved advice given by an attor-
ney in answer to a casually asked question, Erle, C.J. said:
Under the circumstances I do not think the defendant can
be held responsible for the representation he made unless it
could be shown that at the time he made it he knew it to be
false. (Emphasis added.)
It is where the misrepresentation as to law or the mistake in ad-
vice is merely negligent, that the problem of liability to third
parties arises.
At this point it may be well to review some general princi-
ples regarding the law of misrepresentation. Prosser states that
in general there is no liability to third persons for an attorney's
negligent opinion unless a representation is made by the attorney
to the third party or with knowledge that it will be communi-
cated to him for the purpose of inducing action. 10 Obviously the
exceptions in the above rule, which create liability to third par-
ties, are at issue under the circumstances involved in this article.
Our problem here specifically concerns the situation in which the
attorney provides information for a third party, not his client,
well knowing that that third party intends to rely upon his ad-
vice. The true question, as we shall see, is whether or not under
the facts of the situation there is a duty relationship between the
parties, arising from contract or otherwise, for the breach of
which an action in damages will lie.
7 Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 196 N. W. 905 (1924).
8 Supra, n. 6.
10 Prosser, Torts (2nd Ed.) 543.
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The often stated position requiring privity of contract or an
attorney-client relationship between the parties in order to cre-
ate liability on the part of an attorney for his negligence, has for
its basis the important case of Savings Bank v. Ward, which was
decided in the United States Supreme Court in 1879.11 The syl-
labus in that case adequately sets forth the facts involved.
'A,' an attorney at law employed and paid solely by 'B' to
examine and report on the title of the latter to a certain lot
of ground, gave over his signature this certificate. "'B's' title
to the lot is good and the property is unencumbered." 'C,'
with whom 'A' had no contract or communication, relied
upon this certificate as true and loaned money to 'B'; upon
the latter, executing by way of security therefor a deed of
trust for the lot. 'B,' before employing 'A,' had transferred
the lot in fee by a duly recorded conveyance, a fact which
'A' on examining the record could have ascertained had he
exercised a reasonable degree of care. The money loaned
was not paid and 'B' is insolvent. Held: (1) That there be-
ing neither fraud, collusion, nor falsehood by 'A' nor privity
of contract between him and 'C,' he is not liable to the latter
for any loss sustained by reason of the certificate. (2) That
usage cannot make a contract where none was made by the
parties.
In considering this case, an immediate distinction of fact must be
made. It was conceded here that the certificate was made by the
defendant at the request of the applicant for the loan without
any knowledge on the part of the defendant as to the use to be
made of the same, or to whom the certificate was to be presented.
Even when measured by Prosser's theory as given above, which
is a correct statement of the modern law, there would be no cause
of action here because the facts created no duty relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant. But in deciding this case, the
Supreme Court did not confine itself to that reasoning. Drawing
heavily upon the law of England, the court stated the general
proposition that there is no liability on the part of an attorney
in the absence of privity of contract between attorney and client.
In deciding Savings Bank v. Ward, the Supreme Court cited
a large number of English cases. Typical of these is the case of
Winterbottom v. Wright 12 in which a driver of a mail coach was
injured when the coach broke down as a result of a defect in its
11 Supra, n. 3.
12 10 Mee & W. 109.
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construction. In it Lord Abinger imposed upon negligence ac-
tions by consumers against manufacturers the requirement of
privity of contract. Winterbottom v. Wright is a dead letter in
American law and has been ever since Judge Cardozo decided
the case of McPherson v. The Buick Motor Company.13 McPher-
son v. Buick eliminated from the American law of manufactur-
ers' liability both the requirement of privity of contract in negli-
gence actions and all of the exceptions to that rule involving in-
herently dangerous articles. Instead it substituted the simple
question of whether or not there was a duty relationship. Mod-
ern cases citing Savings Bank v. Ward give it a far more re-
stricted meaning than the language contained in the original case.
An example of this may be found in Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas
Company14 where Savings Bank v. Ward is cited for the propo-
sition that:
... as a general rule at least a tort to the person or property
of one man does not make the tort feasor liable to another
merely because the injured person was under a contract with
that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong.
Cases involving the third party liability of attorneys in facts
similar to those under consideration here are rare.15 Much more
common are those involving abstractors of title. In 1899, an Ap-
pellate Court in Indiana, in Brown v. Simms,' held that an ab-
stractor of titles, who, at the request of the owner of lands, fur-
nishes an abstract to a third person knowing that the latter would
use it in determining whether the title is safe to make a loan, is
liable for loss sustained by the third party on the loan through
defects in the title not disclosed by the abstract. However, the
language of the court in this case does not make it clear whether
the liability imposed springs from contract or from tort. At the
conclusion of its opinion, the court seems to follow the early view
that the defendant was liable in tort for the breach of a duty
which arose as a result of a contract.
Is 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
14 47 Ohio Abs. 586, 73 N.E. 2d 200 (1946), quoting from Robinson Dry Dock
v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303.
15 Of close collateral interest is the line of cases involving the liability of
an attorney to an intended beneficiary when the attorney so negligently
draws his client's will as to defeat the right of the intended beneficiary. A
complete annotation on this subject, based on both contract and tort theo-
ries, may be found at 65 A. L. R. 2d 1363.
16 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899).
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A very similar case on facts is the case of Shine v. Nash Ab-
stract & Investment Company.17 Here, however, the abstract of
title was ordered from the defendant by a real estate broker who
was representing both the purchaser and the seller of land. The
court's reasoning again leaves the basis of the liability as be-
tween tort and contract unclear:
But we are of opinion that sound reasoning and the weight
of modern authority sustain the rule of liability for negli-
gence resulting in injury to the vendee, where the vendor is
under duty, or assumes the obligation, to furnish such ab-
stract for the use of the vendee, and the person making the
abstract on the vendor's order has knowledge or notice that
the abstract is for such use, this on the ground that in such
circumstances the engagement of the abstractor by the ven-
dor is a contract made for the benefit of the vendee, and
under such engagement the abstractor owes the vendee, who
is to use and rely on the abstract, the duty of using reason-
able care and skill in examining the records affecting the
title and making the abstract.
Probably the first case to set forth the modern view of tort
liability in this situation is the case of Lawall v. Groman.'8 The
defendant was an attorney who had been employed by a borrow-
er to furnish an abstract of title to certain land to a lender, who
was the plaintiff in this case. The abstract was of the title of land
to be used as a security for the loan. The attorney, in preparing
his abstract, overlooked several encumbrances upon the prop-
erty. In holding that the trial court was in error in granting a
non-suit for the defendant, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
said that the attorney unquestionably acted in some degree for
and in behalf of the lender and the court could not say as a mat-
ter of law that there was no attorney-client relationship.
The court, however, did not rest its ruling upon the possi-
bility of finding an attorney-client relationship between the plain-
tiff and defendant, but went on to say:
If . .. defendant knowing that plaintiff was relying on him
in his professional capacity to see that her mortgage was the
first lien, although Roberts was to pay the fees, undertook
to perform that duty, he was bound to do it with ordinary
and reasonable skill and care in his profession, and would be
liable for negligence in that respect.
17 217 Ala. 498, 117 S. 47 (1928).
18 Supra, n. 6.
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Lawall v. Groman was cited and approved by Justice Car-
dozo when he decided the case of Glanzer v. Shepard.19 There
the defendant was a public weigher and the plaintiff was a buyer
of goods. The defendant had been ordered by a seller of goods
to weigh them and was paid for this service by the seller. The
weigher, however, knew that his certificate of weight would be
furnished to this particular buyer and would be a material factor
in inducing the purchase. In recognizing the liability of the
weigher for negligence in the performance of his duty, Justice
Cardozo said that the duty was not exclusively contractual, but
was imposed by law because of the contract and the relationships
of the parties.
In view of all of the foregoing, the decision of the Circuit
Court of Cuyahoga County (Ohio) in the case of Thomas v. The
Guarantee Title & Trust Company,20 appears to run contrary
to the main stream of modern American Law. The first and third
syllabi in this opinion, which have never been overruled in Ohio,
read as follows:
1. An action against an abstractor to recover damages for
negligence in making or certifying an abstract of title does
not sound in tort, but must be founded on contract; and the
general rule is that an abstractor can be held liable for such
negligence only to the person who employed him.
3. A custom which would relieve a purchaser from the
obligations imposed upon him by the doctrine of caveat
emptor, which requires the vendee to protect himself by ex-
press covenants and investigation of the title which he is to
acquire, is contrary to law.
In defense of the court in this case it must be pointed out
that the facts show that the defendant abstractor was unaware
of the purpose for which his abstract was to be used or the per-
son to whom it was to be transmitted.
No discussion of the liability for negligent misrepresentation
should be left without some reference to the case of Ultramares
Corporation v. Touche.21 This landmark decision by Justice Car-
dozo is still the outstanding case in this area. It involved a firm
of accountants who negligently certified a corporation's balance
sheet with the expectation that it would be used as a basis for
19 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
20 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N.E. 183 (1910).
21 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139 (1931).
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financial dealings in general but without knowledge of the par-
ticular plaintiff who would rely upon it in making a loan. The
defendant accountants were held liable in deceit upon the ground
that their neglect was so grave as to justify a finding of conscious
ignorance. Liability in negligence was rejected because there
was no contemplation of reliance by the specific plaintiff. We
will return at a later point in this article to a consideration of
this case in connection with the liability for fraud or deceit which
may arise in such circumstances. Here it is sufficient to note that
while this case is clearly in accord with other decisions in this
area, it draws the clear line at which liability for negligent mis-
representation ends. That line is the point where the defendant
is unaware of the particular plaintiff to whom his representations
will be transmitted, even though he is aware of the fact that the
person for whom he prepares his opinion or report will transmit
it to some unknown person for the purpose of relying upon it.
I
In approaching the question of the liability of an attorney
who gives advice as to foreign law, it is necessary at the outset
to consider and then set aside all of those situations which in-
volve misrepresentation actionable as a fraud. Such fraudulent
representation might involve not only the substance of the law
itself but the competence of the attorney including whether or
not he was admitted to the bar of the foreign state, or whether
or not he was an expert in the law of that state, or even the attor-
ney's state of mind when he gives an opinion. When an attorney
has made such fraudulent representation either as to the sub-
stance of the law or as to his own competence so as to induce the
reliance of some person, he will, when his opinion later turns out
to be erroneous, be liable not merely for his negligence in arriv-
ing at his opinion, but for the effects of the fraudulent represen-
tation itself. If the representation has induced reliance, it will
make no difference whether he was careful or negligent in arriv-
ing at his opinion, for the action will not be founded upon negli-
gent errors in his opinion but on the misrepresentation.
We have already considered negligent misrepresentation as
to the substance of the law and it is worth noting at this point
how fine the line is between mere negligent misrepresentation
and misrepresentation actionable as fraud. An excellent example
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss1/5
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of this problem is the case of Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche.22 This is the earlier described case involving the firm of
accountants who certified certain facts to be true as of their own
knowledge. During the course of his opinion, regarding the cause
of action in fraud, Justice Cardozo said:
The defendants certified as a fact true to their own knowl-
edge that the balance sheet was in accordance with the books
of account. If their statement was false they are not to be
exonerated because they believed it to be true.
This statement does not, as one might think at first, deny
the requirement of scienter in actions for fraud. It merely recog-
nizes the fact that when a defendant "certifies as a fact true to
his own knowledge" that he is making in effect two representa-
tions. He is representing that certain facts are true and he is
representing that he is saying so from his own knowledge. To
show that he actually believed the facts to be true relieves him
of the onus of fraud as to only one of those representations.
The point to be stressed in regard to the foregoing is the
fact that the accountants were held liable not for their fraud in
certifying as true that which was not true, but for their fraud in
saying that they knew something which they in fact did not
know. Of course, an obvious distinction may be made between
an accountant's certification of a record and an attorney's opin-
ion regarding a doubtful legal matter. But the Ultramares case
still demonstrates how fine the line is between fraudulent mis-
representation and negligent misrepresentation.
Setting aside misrepresentation actionable as fraud, we can
now consider the liability of the attorney with regard to advice
on foreign law as the liability sounds in the law of contract and
negligence. It appears that there are at least four major vari-
ables in any of the liability situations which we will consider.
The first is the state in which the attorney has been admitted to
the practice of law. The second is the particular state in which
he is actually practicing law. The third is the state whose law
he is giving an opinion upon. The fourth is the state in which
an action is brought against the attorney.
It is necessary to make at least one basic assumption on
which to build the remainder of our argument. This is the as-
sumption that an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Ohio
22 Ibid.
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and actually physically practicing law in Ohio is entitled to give
advice to his Ohio client as to the law of Ohio or any other for-
eign or alien jurisdiction. This appears to be an entirely reason-
able assumption. Were it not valid, the subject of conflict of
laws would be forbidden ground for 99 percent of attorneys, and
every action would have to be brought in the state in which the
cause of action accrued or it would have to be prosecuted by an
attorney admitted to the bar in both the state of accrual and the
state of the forum. This, manifestly, is not the way things are
done.
The only reported cases which exist in this area bear out the
argument that an attorney incurs only the ordinary liability of
an attorney when he gives advice as to foreign law. Indeed,
there is one case widely cited for the proposition that an attor-
ney incurs no liability in such a situation. In Fenaille v. Coud-
ert,213 the court in its opinion said that attorneys in one state are
not presumed to know the law of a sister state in the absence of
an express declaration even though they accepted employment
to draw up a contract to be performed in the second state.
It is rather doubtful that this case is the law anywhere to-
day. Indeed, the proposition for which it is cited is considerably
broader than the facts of the case would allow. It was actually
only an action on the case brought against New York attorneys
who drew a contract to be performed in New Jersey but failed
to advise their client that under the laws of New Jersey such a
contract required recording. The holding in Fenaille v. Coudert
is even more remarkable when one considers that misrepresenta-
tions as to matters of foreign law are normally actionable when
they are made by a layman. Although misrepresentations as to
local law made by a layman are not ordinarily actionable since
everyone is presumed to know the law, this is not true of foreign
law. An entire annotation on this may be found at 24 A. L. R.
2d 1039.
Without specifically mentioning the case of Fenaille v. Coud-
ert, a New York court, in Degen v. Steinbrink,24 disapproved of
the principle stated therein. This case involved a negligence ac-
tion brought against a firm of attorneys who had improperly
23 44 N.J.L. 286 (1882); see also 6 C.J. 698, n. 43; and Ann. Cas. 1917 B, p. 11.
24 202 App. Div. 477, 195 N.Y.S. 810, aff'd 236 N.Y. 669, 142 N.E. 328 (1922).
See also In re Roel, 3 N.Y. 2d 224, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 31, 144 N.E. 2d 24 (1957).
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drawn a chattel mortgage on property located in another state.
In the course of its opinion, the court said:
The law governing the creation of liens on personal property
by chattel mortgages is statute law. This every lawyer
should know, and further that the statute law of one state
usually differs from the statute law of another as to form of
the instrument, as to the form of acknowledgment and as
to other requirements. When a lawyer undertakes to pre-
pare papers to be filed in a state foreign to his place of prac-
tice, it is his duty, if he has no knowledge of the statutes,
to inform himself, for like any artisan, by undertaking the
work he represents that he is capable of performing it in a
skillful manner. Not to do so, and to prepare documents
that have no legal potency by reason of their lack of com-
pliance with simple statutory requirements is such a negli-
gent discharge of his duty to his client as should render him
liable for loss sustained by reason of such negligence ...
It would be a very dangerous precedent to adopt that in this
state where, by reason of its being the financial center of the
Union, members of the bar are called upon to advise as to
large loans and to draft instruments securing such loans that
must be filed or recorded in other states, attorneys could
escape liability for unskillful and negligent work which had
rendered the securities worthless and could shield them-
selves behind the plea: "I am a New York lawyer. I am not
presumed to know the law of any other state."
In the case of Rekeweg v. Federal Mutual Insurance Com-
pany,25 the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Indiana in 1961 adopted the reasoning of Degen v. Stein-
brink.
It is a fair conclusion from the foregoing cases that an attor-
ney who is admitted to State "A" and who is physically in State
"A" may give advice on the law of State "B." If he is sued in
State "A" as a result of his action, he will enjoy whatever privi-
leges or immunities attached to his status as an attorney and will
have only the ordinary liability of an attorney in such a situ-
ation.
Does it make any difference in which state the action is
brought against an attorney? Here, our earlier discussion of
whether or not the action sounds in tort or in contract assumes
some importance. As demonstrated, the liability of an attorney,
whether based upon contract or upon a duty relationship, is de-
25 27 F.R.D. 431 (1961).
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termined by the law of negligence. That is to say, the ultimate
question is only whether or not he has complied with the proper
standard of care. Ordinarily, the law of the place where the in-
jury is incurred governs negligence actions. The situation under
consideration, however, appears to fall well within one of the ex-
ceptions to this rule. A person who is required by law to act or
not to act in one state in a certain manner, will not be held liable
for the results of such action or failure to act which occur in an-
other state, and a person who acts pursuant to a privilege con-
ferred by the law of the place of acting will not be held liable for
the results of his act in another state, so long as he is within the
proper exercise of his privilege.2 This statement is drawn from
the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, Section 382, en-
titled Duty or Privilege to Act. Sub-section (2) of that section
says:
A person who acts pursuant to a privilege conferred by the
law of the place of acting will not be held liable for the re-
sults of his act in another state.
One of the illustrations given for this rule is the following: 2 7
4. By the law of State 'X' a person who acting in a non-
negligent manner harms another in a reasonable attempt to
save the life of a third person is not liable to the other; by
the law of State 'Y' he is liable. 'A' in State 'X' seeing 'B'
about to murder 'C' shoots at 'B.' The bullet fails to hit 'B'
but does hit and wound 'C' who is at the time standing in
State 'Y.' The act of 'A' is privileged by the law of 'X' not
by the law of 'Y.' If 'A' is not negligent in the use of his
gun he is not liable to 'C.'
Transposing this illustration to the situation under consider-
ation, it might read:
By the law of Ohio an attorney admitted to the practice of
law in Ohio who gives advice in a non-negligent manner is
not liable for errors in his opinion. By the law of State 'X'
he is liable for such errors. An attorney giving advice in
Ohio in a non-negligent manner which proves to be erro-
neous and causes a loss to his client in State 'X' is acting
within his privilege and is not liable when sued in State
X,'
26 11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, § 182, p. 493.
27 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,
§ 382, p. 467.
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The foregoing illustration assumes that there is some State
'X' in which an attorney not admitted to the practice of law in
that state is absolutely liable for the errors in his opinion wheth-
er they be negligent or not. This, as we shall see, may not be
the case.
The conclusion from the foregoing would seem to be that the
particular state in which an action is brought against an attorney
is not a determinative factor.
Having assumed that an attorney practicing in the jurisdic-
tion where he is admitted is entitled to give advice on all the law
and having come to the conclusion that the state in which an
action is brought against him is not a material factor, we are left
with only two situations to consider. They are:
(1) An attorney admitted to the practice of law in State 'B'
while physically in State 'A' and practicing law in State
'A' gives advice on the law of State 'B.'
(2) An attorney admitted to the practice of law in State 'A'
while physically in and practicing law in State 'B' gives
advice on the law of State 'B.'
It needs no authority to assert that in the second situation
above, the attorney is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.
The same may be said for situation number one. This conclusion
is supported by the case of In re Roel 2 8 In that case, a Mexican
citizen and lawyer admitted to the practice of law in Mexico but
never admitted to the New York bar maintained an office in New
York for the purpose of giving advice on Mexican law. He was
held to be practicing law in the state of New York without a
license to do so, and was enjoined from further engaging in his
occupation.
Since in both of the above situations the attorney is engaged
in the unlicensed practice of law, it becomes immediately appar-
ent that the question of whose law an attorney is giving advice
on is not an important one. The important question is, "where
is he practicing law, and where has he been admitted to the prac-
tice of law?" An attorney is not practicing law in a foreign juris-
diction merely because he gives advice as to the law of that juris-
diction.
The obvious inference is that an attorney is practicing law
28 Supra, n. 24.
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in the place where he is physically present when he gives his
opinion. It is the law of that place that determines under what,
if any, privilege he is acting.
IV
Assuming that an attorney finds himself in a position of
practicing law without a license to do so, what then is his liabil-
ity? There are no useful cases involving the question of an at-
torney licensed in one state practicing law in another state. There
are, however, a few cases involving laymen practicing law. The
first of these to be considered is the California case of Biankaja
v. Irving.29 In that case, the defendant was a notary public and
an accountant who was asked by a testator to draw a will for
him. It would appear that the testator was aware that the de-
fendant was not an attorney. The defendant drew the will as
requested and notarized the testator's signature but he did not
have the will witnessed as required by California law. As a re-
sult, the testator's intended bequest failed and the plaintiff in this
action was the intended legatee. The trial court found for the
plaintiff and the Appellate Court affirmed. In affirming the de-
cision of the trial court, the Appellate Court had first to deal
with the older decision of Buckley v. Gray30 which had held that
a legatee whose right of inheritance had been defeated by an
attorney's negligence in drawing a will had no right of action in
negligence against the attorney because there was no privity of
contract between them. The Appellate Court distinguished the
cases in that in the earlier one the defendant had in fact been
an attorney, whereas in Biankaja v. Irving, the defendant was
not an attorney, and pointed out that the defendant's act vio-
lated the section of the business and professional code which
provides for licensing of attorneys.
The Appellate Court went on to reason that since the de-
fendant had violated that section of the code, he was guilty of
negligence as a matter of law and therefore liable for the injury
to the intended beneficiary.
The defendant in Biankaja v. Irving appealed his case to the
California Supreme Court (whose opinion may be found at 320
P. 2d 16). The Supreme Court affirmed, but, rather than follow
the dubious reasoning of the Appellate Court, flatly overruled
29 --- Cal. App _. , 310 P. 2d 63 (1957).
80 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900, L.RA. 862 (1895).
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the earlier case of Buckley v. Gray. In its decision the Supreme
Court abandoned almost without comment the Appellate Court's
argument that violation of the licensing statute constituted negli-
gence per se. The Supreme Court noted that the statute existed
and said:
Defendant undertook to provide for the formal disposition
of Maroevich's estate by drafting and supervising the exe-
cution of a will. This was an important transaction requir-
ing specialized skill and defendant clearly was not qualified
to undertake it. His conduct was not only negligent but was
also highly improper. He engaged in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law . . . which is a misdemeanor in violation of Sec-
tion 6126 of the Business and Professions Code. Such con-
duct should be discouraged and not protected by immunity
from civil liability as would be the case if plaintiff, the only
person who suffered a loss, were denied a right of action.
The foregoing case obviously leaves considerable doubt as to
the law of California. It is impossible to tell whether the action-
able negligence in that case was the undertaking of a job for
which the defendant was not qualified or whether the negligence
was in fact the obviously negligent act of failing to secure two
witnesses to a will. In any case, the Supreme Court did not re-
peat the Appellate Court's statement that violation of the licens-
ing statute was in itself negligence pe se.
The case of Latson v. Eaton31 was decided after the decision
of the California Appellate Court in Biankaja v. Irving but before
the decision of the Supreme Court. The defendant, James Lat-
son, was not a licensed practitioner but he undertook to prepare
certain promissory notes, deeds and mortgages, which task he
did negligently to the result that the plaintiffs lost their prop-
erty. In its opinion, the court cites the Appellate decision in
Biankaja v. Irving and appears to adopt the view that violation
of the licensing statute constitutes negligence per se. The sylla-
bus of the court, however, is entirely different. It reads:
A person not licensed to practice law who for hire prepares
promissory notes, deeds and mortgages, is liable to his em-
ployer for any damages caused by his negligent preparation
of such documents. (Emphasis added.)
This syllabus would appear to be much more in line with the
large body of decisions regarding various types of licensing stat-
31 --- Okla. __ 341 P. 2d 247 (1959).
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utes. It has ordinarily been held that practicing a profession
without a license is not the proximate cause of a person's injury.
Rather it is the negligent practice which is the cause of the
injury.
In Mattieligh v. Poe32 the court, in its opinion, cites both
Biankaja v. Irving and Latson v. Eaton and also footnotes a Van-
derbilt Law Review article33 which interpreted unauthorized
practice of law as negligence per se. It does not, however, speak
up in favor of the principle that the violation of a licensing stat-
ute constitutes negligence per se. In fact the case is almost en-
tirely devoid of reasoning one way or the other. Nine justices
participated in the decision. One wrote the opinion, five con-
curred. One concurred in the result, three dissented. None of
the nine presented any reasoning particularly apropos of the
problem at hand.
Of course, cases involving defendants who were not admit-
ted to the practice of law anywhere are not perfectly analogous
to the situation under inquiry; that is, where an attorney is ad-
mitted to the practice in one state but is caught practicing in an-
other state. The pessimistic assumption that such an attorney
would be regarded merely as a layman may or may not be justi-
fied. The common practice indulged in today of having your
attorney travel to various parts of the country to represent you
may invite a different type of ruling.
An interesting analogy may be found in the area of medical
malpractice cases involving physicians not properly licensed for
the practice of medicine. The American Law Reports have treat-
ed this issue three times.34 In the 1926 case of Brown v. Shyne,3 5
it was held that the failure of a chiropractor to secure a license
as required by state statute could not be made the basis of negli-
gence in a malpractice suit since the violation had no direct bear-
ing on the injury and the injury would not have been obviated
had he been licensed. Earlier cases in California, 8 Michigan,8 7
and Illinois 8 had similar holdings.
32 57 Wash. 2d 203, 356 P. 2d 328 (1960).
33 11 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 599 (1957-8).
84 44 A. L. R. 1418; 57 A. L. R. 978; 13 A. L. R. 2d 148.
35 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926).
86 Bute v. Potts, 76 Cal. 304, 18 P. 329 (1888).
87 Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159 (1925).
8 Smith v. Swinehart, 209 Ill. App. 175 (1917).
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In 1927 a Massachusetts court, in Whipple v. Grandchamp,39
sustained the correctness of an instruction to the jury to the
effect that an unlicensed practitioner of medicine was to be held
to the same standard of care as if he were a licensed practition-
er. In so doing, however, the court commented that the trial
court's instruction was probably more favorable to the defend-
ant than he was entitled to. The whole tenor of the opinion im-
plies that the Massachusetts Supreme Court was of the opinion
that liability could have been predicated upon the failure to se-
cure a license alone.
Cases in this area are difficult to analyse for the reason that
while many of them are decided on what purports to be negli-
gence law they contain facts which would also support an action
for fraud. An example of a case involving actionable fraud is the
case of Harris v. Graham.40 The defendant represented himself
to be a physician and he was not. Not only was he not a physi-
cian, he was a charlatan and a quack. The court recognized that
this was an action in fraud and had no difficulty arriving at the
defendant's liability. And the measure of the liability was what-
ever injury naturally and probably flowed from the misrepre-
sentation.
In 1927 a New York court in Monohan v. Devinny,41 held
that defendants who, though unlicensed, were practicing medi-
cine should be held to the same standard of skill and care as
prevail among those who are licensed. Other jurisdictions which
have also held that the lack of the license is not the proximate
cause of an injury are Washington,42 Georgia, 43 North Caro-
lina,44 and Ohio. 45 Thus the weight of authority, where such ex-
ists, supports the proposition that the failure of a physician to
procure a license does not in itself give rise to any right of re-
covery in one of his patients. To maintain an action in malprac-
tice the plaintiff must show that the result complained of was
due to negligence or unskillful treatment. The same ruling lends
39 261 Mass. 40, 158 N.E. 270 (1927).
40 124 Okla. 196, 255 P. 710 (1927).
41 223 App. Div. 547, 229 N.Y.S. 60 (1928).
42 Joly v. Mellor, 163 Wash. 48, 299 P. 660 (1931).
43 Andrews v. Lofton, 80 Ga. App. 723, 57 S.E. 2d 338 (1950).
44 Grier v. Phillips, 230 N.C. 672, 55 S.E. 2d 485 (1949).
45 Willett v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E. 2d 457 (1938); Rush v.
Akron General Hospital, 84 Ohio Abs. 292 (1957).
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itself easily to application in the area of the attorney-client rela-
tionship.
V
Whether or not an attorney practicing law in a state in
which he is actually admitted to the bar derives any benefit from
employing other counsel when he is called upon to give advice
on foreign law, is a matter open to some argument. There is no
clear authority. In Wildermann v. Wachtell,46 both the client and
the attorney realized the necessity for the employment of foreign
counsel to handle a procedural matter in connection with the
collection of a claim against an estate in the foreign jurisdiction.
Foreign counsel recommended by the local attorney was re-
tained and, apparently at a meeting of the three parties, a formal
retainer was signed by the client employing both the attorneys
to collect the claim on a 50% contingency basis. The foreign
attorney was negligent in the handling of his portion of the work.
The court said:
The novel question arises therefore as yet undetermined in
this state whether a lawyer here who retains with due care
an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction to take care of pro-
cedural matters in the foreign state becomes ipso facto liable
for any negligence of the foreign attorney even though the
client has been informed of the necessity and reason for the
retainer and has approved the course and choice of attor-
ney...
Here the New York attorney recognized his inability to take
care of Pennsylvania procedure and for that reason had his
client retain a Pennsylvania attorney. A lawyer should not
be held to a stricter rule in foreign matters than the exercise
of due care in recommending a foreign attorney. To do so
would subject him to hazards which he is not qualified either
to anticipate or to prevent ...
It was held that the local attorney was not liable for the
negligence of the foreign attorn ,y. This case, however, is not
entirely apropos of the subject at hand. For one thing, it in-
volves the conduct of procedural matters in a foreign jurisdiction
where clearly the New York attorney could not act. Second, it
is a situation in which it appears that the client retained the for-
eign attorney on the suggestion of local counsel. It was not a
situation of local counsel delegating his job to a foreign attorney.
46 149 Misc. 623, 267 N.Y.S. 840 (1933).
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An annotation to the foregoing case may be found at 47 Harvard
Law Review 1056. It is compared with a number of other cases
wherein attorneys have been held to be involved in joint ven-
tures and therefore jointly liable for each other's negligence.
In Floro v. Lawto 4 7 one attorney could not present evidence
at trial because of a conflict in his calendar. He talked with an-
other attorney about doing the trial work and in effect the two
attorneys agreed to divide the fee or returns from the case half
and half. The procedure and the situation were explained to the
client and he consented that the second attorney should try the
case. It was held that each attorney was responsible to the client
and if the attorney who tried the case was liable for malpractice,
the first attorney would also be liable. The ruling in Wildermann
v. Wachtell was urged by the defense in this case. However, the
California court declined to follow it under the facts in this situ-
ation, and instead adopted the rule suggested by Senneff v.
Healy48 and Hill v. Curtis.49 Both of those cases involved hold-
ings to the effect that attorneys were involved in joint ventures
in their activities. Both cases, however, involved questions of the
rights between the attorneys involved, and not the question of
the rights of the client.
At 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, Section 47, Page 287, the
author says:
. . . Nor does the fact that an attorney entrusts to another
the performance of a duty undertaken by him relieve him
from his obligation to exercise reasonable care, skill and
diligence in the performance of the duty..
Indeed, there is authority both ample and venerable for the
proposition that an attorney cannot delegate to another the tasks
entrusted to him.5o These cases, however, involve situations
where the attorney has not obtained the prior consent of his
client to the delegation, and are based on ordinary rules of the
agent-principal relationship. In one annotation involving cases
of this type,51 the author says:
47 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rep. 98 (1961).
48 155 Iowa 82, 135 N.W. 27 (1912).
49 154 App. Div. 662, 139 N.Y.S. 428 (1913).
50 Goodman v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482, 68 Am. Dec. 134 (1857); Cummins v.
Heald, 24 Kans. 600, 36 Am. Rep. 264 (1880); Dickson v. Wright, 52 Miss.
585, 24 Am. Rep. 677 (1876); Antrobus v. Sherman, 65 Iowa 230, 21 N.W. 579(1884).
51 Ann. Cas. 1917 B, page 18.
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As a general rule an attorney has no power to delegate the
authority reposed in him to another .... If he does so with-
out his client's consent he becomes liable on principles of
agency for negligence, default or wrong doing on the part
of his substitute ...
All of the cases cited in the foregoing annotation involve
liability of the attorney to his client. It is interesting to speculate
what difference it would make if the plaintiff were some third
party such as the parties whose rights we are considering in this
article. There, the rules of the principal-agency relationship
should not be applicable since the parties are not attorney and
client. If the use of foreign counsel were clearly made apparent
in the attorney's opinion it should not result in vicarious tort
liability. Liability for negligent selection of foreign counsel
would, of course, remain (as well as liability for any breach of
contract involved in the delegation).
VI
The conclusions to be drawn from this inquiry are these.
An attorney has a very definite liability to persons other than
his client for mistaken opinions when he knows in advance that
the opinion will be transmitted to some specific person who will
rely on it. This third person may sue the attorney on either a
third party beneficiary contract theory or a tri-partite contract
theory if the facts actually support such a relation, but it is not
necessary for him to find a contract. He has a right of action in
tort for the negligence. Indeed, even when a right of action in
contract may be found, the measure of performance is exactly
the same measure of due care which is used in a negligence
action. It would appear that when the attorney's advice con-
cerns foreign law, a mistaken opinion would create no special
liability other than the normal liability for erroneous opinions
so long as the attorney is physically practicing law in a place
where he is admitted to the bar. Conceivably, however, an attor-
ney could be regarded by a court when he is physically present
in some other jurisdiction as being no better than a layman prac-
ticing law. The weight of authority, however, appears to support
the proposition that even under those circumstances no unusual
or absolute liability would arise for his mistakes.
Whether or not it is advisable to employ local counsel in
such situations is a matter for some debate. A plaintiff could
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argue that he contracted for the opinion of a particular lawyer
not some other local counsel and he might argue that there had
been an unlawful delegation of duty. However, an equally good
argument may be made for the proposition that not employing
local counsel is equivalent to not using due care in preparation
of an opinion.
Making clear in a memorandum or opinion that local coun-
sel has or has not been employed is probably more important
than the actual decision of whether or not to use local counsel.
Any misrepresentation actionable as fraud must be avoided at
all costs, for absolute liability will certainly arise under such a
situation. This applies also to making it clear in a memorandum
or opinion that the lawyer rendering it is or is not admitted to
the bar in the particular state whose law he is dealing with. It
would appear to be important to negative any inference of par-
ticular expert knowledge in areas of foreign law. So long as
these steps are taken and fraudulent misrepresentation is avoid-
ed it would appear that no unusual liability arises because of
mistakes of the type considered here.
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